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# *Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union*

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Our purpose in this article is to determine the degree to which the cultural requisites to democracy are present in the contemporary political culture of the USSR. We focus on support for core democratic rights, liberties, and institutions. Data for this project come from a survey of 504 citizens of the Moscow *Oblast* conducted between February 17, 1990, and March 4, 1990.

In absolute terms, support for democratic values is fairly widespread in the Moscow *Oblast*. We found significant levels of endorsement of competitive elections and for many democratic rights and liberties such as liberty and the norms of democracy. Many of the scales measuring support for democratic rights were intercorrelated, leading us to hypothesize the existence of a general underlying dimension of democratic values. The best predictors of attitudes toward general democratic values were education, gender, and age. The better educated, males, and the young tended to be more supportive of democratic institutions and processes. We take these findings as evidence that further efforts to democratize the Soviet Union will *not* meet resistance from Soviet political culture.

**P**olitical change is occurring in the Soviet Union and eastern and central Europe at a dizzying and historic pace.<sup>1</sup> Since the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, nearly every month has witnessed dramatic new alterations in the Soviet status quo. The political world as it has been known since World War II is being totally restructured, mostly along a more demo-

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, change is occurring so quickly in the USSR that between the original and final versions of this paper many events transpired, including the August putsch by antidemocratic forces in 1991. We have made only minor alterations in the body of this paper in reaction to those events, saving our evaluations of political changes in the USSR since the survey for the conclusions to the article and for additional analyses.

cratic mold. Not for 150 years have there been such possibilities—and hopes—for a more democratic world.

It is by no means clear, however, that the changes currently occurring in the Soviet Union will continue along a more democratic path. There is always the possibility of an elite-based counterreaction to the Gorbachev-inspired reforms. Ancient ethnic hatreds may consume even the most reform-minded movements. Perhaps more important, structural transformations imposed from the top of Soviet society may meet resistance from the political culture of the country. The beliefs, values, and actions of ordinary Soviet citizens will certainly play a role in the processes of change. After all, democracy is more than a set of political institutions; it requires sustenance from a myriad of political, social, legal, and economic values resident in the hearts and minds of the ordinary members of the polity. As Brown has noted: “change in the Soviet political culture . . . [will] pave the way for other changes—institutional as well as cultural” (1989, 26).

This article is grounded in the basic assumption that processes of change are dependent upon the political culture of the polity. The beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens structure (and perhaps set limits on) both the pace of and possibilities for change. Though cultural theory does not provide a complete explanation of political change, culture undoubtedly influences the process mightily.

More specifically, our purpose in this article is to determine the degree to which the cultural requisites to democracy are present in the contemporary political culture of the USSR. We focus on one major aspect of Soviet culture: *support for core democratic rights, liberties, and institutions*. Our purpose is not only to describe contemporary Soviet culture but also to determine whether the various attitudes pertaining to democratic values are organized within a democratic belief system.

We begin this analysis with a consideration of some of the key cultural requisites of democratic government. We then examine the values of our Soviet sample in an attempt to identify the relatively more and less democratic attributes of the Soviet political culture. Finally, we analyze the distribution of these attitudes throughout important segments of Soviet society in an effort to assess the implications of the values for the future of the USSR. Though much of our analysis is tentative and speculative, we are attempting in this article to take advantage of one of the first Western surveys of public opinion conducted in the Soviet Union to assess the implications of cultural values for the immense processes of change that are currently underway. For the moment, it is useful to consider in more detail just what constitutes a “democratic political culture.”

## CULTURAL REQUISITES TO DEMOCRACY

Political theorists have long attempted to identify the particular cultural values<sup>2</sup> that are conducive to the development of democratic polities (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963, 1980; Dahl 1971, 1989; Inglehart 1990),<sup>3</sup> and most would agree with the simple proposition that “the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process—upon the political culture” (Almond and Verba 1963, 498).<sup>4</sup> Dahl, in making a general point about the importance of the beliefs of citizens, especially influential citizens, for the development of “polyarchies” or democracies, offers the Soviet Union as an illustrative case:

. . . The Soviet Union has developed all the attributes of an MDP [modern dynamic pluralist country] except for the relatively low level of organizational autonomy and hence of pluralism. Though it is modern and dynamic, even the liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev has not yet brought about a highly pluralistic society. One cannot fully explain the rejection of greater pluralism by the leadership . . . without taking into account the weakness of democratic ideas, beliefs, and traditions in Russia throughout its history and the commitment of the leadership since 1918 to a Leninist view of the world (Dahl 1989, 262).

Virtually every scholar who has thought about processes of democratization<sup>5</sup> has ascribed an important role to political culture (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Huntington 1984; Inglehart 1990; DiPalma 1990; Lijphart 1990).

At the same time, there is little agreement on a list of specific cultural

<sup>2</sup> Political culture may be defined as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics” (Pye and Verba 1965, 513).

<sup>3</sup> By “democracy” we mean a political system that grants unimpaired opportunities for all full citizens

1. to formulate their preferences,
2. to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; and
3. to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference (Dahl 1971, 1–2).

Democracies need not allow all political interests equal *influence* over public policies, but they must allow all political interests *equal opportunity to compete* for the control of public policies.

<sup>4</sup> There has recently been a resurgence of interest in cultural theories (e.g., Wildavsky 1987). Indeed, Eckstein has argued that cultural theory “may plausibly be considered one of two still viable general approaches to political theory and explanation,” and that “determining which of the two modes of theorizing and explaining—the ‘culturalist’ or the ‘rationalist’—is likely to give the better results may be the single most important item now on the agenda of political science” (Eckstein 1988, 789).

<sup>5</sup> We refer to these processes as “democratization” even though we do not believe that “democratization” necessarily leads to democracy, either ever or in a linear or even monotonic fashion. “Democratization” for us means movement along a continuum, not the creation of a democratic polity.

attributes that is conducive to democratic development. While nearly everyone recognizes that interpersonal trust is important (because it facilitates coalition formation), and all believe that a healthy dose of political tolerance is essential, not everyone agrees that satisfaction with one's life, for instance, is crucial to democratic development. Perhaps more importantly, there have been only a smattering of attempts to test the hypothesis that culture influences democratization (e.g., Inglehart 1988, 1990; Almond and Verba 1963), and many of these suffer from a host of methodological problems inherent in comparative research. Thus, at the general level, there is a broad consensus that democratization is affected by culture, but there is much less agreement on the specifics.

One of the most persistent and insightful thinkers on this problem is Robert Dahl. His list of cultural values thought conducive to democratic development is of particular interest to us.<sup>6</sup> He cites the following as important to the development of democracy (or "polyarchy"):<sup>7</sup> (1) belief in the legitimacy of the institutions of democracy—public contestation and participation; (2) beliefs about authority relationships between government and the governed; (3) confidence in the capacity of the government to deal effectively with the country's problems; (4) political and interpersonal trust; and (5) belief in the possibility and desirability of political cooperation mixed with a belief in the legitimacy of conflict.<sup>8</sup> More simply put, a democratic citizen is one who believes in individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes. Though there are undoubtedly those who would quibble with this list, it would be largely on the need to supplement the roster rather than delete items from it.

In order to think about the cultural implications of these institutional guarantees we have reorganized them just a bit. A democratic political culture is a set of norms that (1) encourage the formation of individual and collective preferences; (2) and the submission of those preferences to the political arena for satisfaction; (3) within the context of support for a set of institutional

<sup>6</sup> Dahl, and many others, actually focus on the beliefs of "political activists" (see Gibson and Duch 1991a). We agree that political activists are of special importance and we discuss their beliefs below. The values of ordinary citizens are important nonetheless (as Dahl himself notes: "This concern [for the beliefs of political activists] does not mean that the beliefs held among the less influential strata are irrelevant, but only that a stronger case can be made for treating the beliefs of the politically most active and involved strata as an important explanatory factor" [1971, 127]), and we will not distinguish leaders from followers in this discussion of the theoretical literature.

<sup>7</sup> For simplicity, we have substituted the word "democracy" for Dahl's "polyarchy."

<sup>8</sup> See also Dahl 1989, 262, for a more recent restatement of the importance of these attributes.

arrangements for political decision making that is responsive to these preferences. At the stage of preference formation and articulation, we focus on *democratic rights and liberties*; institutional arrangements are operationalized as *support for democratic institutions*. Each of these represents a sector of a democratic political culture, and each will be the object of our inquiry.

This research focuses on support for basic democratic rights, liberties, and institutions under the assumption that such beliefs can constrain structural processes of democratization. For instance, competitive elections are difficult to implement in the context of widespread beliefs that diverse political parties exacerbate and create conflicts in society. Similarly, to the extent that ordinary citizens are intolerant of political diversity, democratic openness and competition are impeded. Certainly culture does not completely determine structure and practice, but it is difficult to understand the possibilities for reform without consideration of the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens.

#### EARLIER RESEARCH ON SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE

The paucity of rigorous survey data have not kept scholars from attempting to understand Soviet political culture. Though one must be careful about relying on secondary efforts to analyze mass political culture, we can nonetheless draw some important conclusions from this body of literature.

Few observers of the USSR are sanguine about the development of a democratic political culture.<sup>9</sup> Most argue that traditional Russian culture harbors deep strains of authoritarianism, and that seven decades of Communist rule have strongly reinforced those tendencies. For example, Brown argues that “the relative absence of pluralist and democratic political structures during a historically long period should make it less than surprising that attachment to individual political liberties, and support for their institutionalization, remains weak” (1989, 18).<sup>10</sup> Perhaps the key cultural enemy of democracy in

<sup>9</sup> See for examples Pipes 1974, 1991; DiFranceisco and Gitelman 1984; Keenan 1986; Brzezinski 1976, 1989; White 1979, 1984; Lacquer 1989. For examples of contrary views see Hough 1972, 1988; Lewin 1988; Starr 1988; Lapidus 1989; and Ruble 1990.

<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Zaslavskaya argues:

It is unfortunate that neither Russian prerevolutionary nor Soviet politics developed strong traditions of genuinely democratic relations. People have paid the price for centuries of serfdom and autocratic tyranny and decades of lawlessness under Stalin and Brezhnev. They either did not have the chance to acquire or have lost the culture of political and national tolerance, social dialogues conducted with mutual respect, collective attempts to find a compromise, and sensible agreements reached by striking a balance between conflicting interests. The low level of political culture has led to measures to extend democracy being perceived by certain groups as the right to fight for their interests by any methods including undemocratic ones” (Zaslavskaya 1990, 198).

the Soviet Union is the desire for order. Since liberty inevitably poses a potential for disorder, opposition to democratization is thought to be concentrated among order-loving Soviets.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, there are clearly important secular trends that probably have contributed to a wider preference for democratic liberties, institutions, and processes. Four are of particular importance: (1) the dramatic urbanization of the country; (2) relatively healthy economic growth; (3) widespread diffusion of electronic media; and (4) the rapid rise in education levels. Lucian Pye, in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, has recently argued a similar position. He asserted that "modernization theory" has been vindicated by recent events in the world. By this he meant that the increasingly significant flows of international trade, finance, and especially communications, the worldwide spread of science and technology, and the universal establishment of educational systems have contributed to unprecedented pressures for political change in nearly every country in the world (Pye 1990). These pressures are especially severe within authoritarian countries, in part because

the modernization process inevitably changes the character of [the] relationship between subjects and rulers so that the benefits increasingly seem smaller and the costs of forgoing freedom greater. The emergence of a middle class and the growth of a technically educated population create new centers of power, leading to drastically altered attitudes about the nature of authority (Pye 1990, 9).

In the case of the Soviet Union, modernization has created a new cleavage in society: "A significant middle class has emerged, the members of which demand greater intellectual and cultural freedoms and are contemptuous of the poorly educated bureaucrats and party apparatchiks, that is, most of the *no-menklatura*. But there are also vast numbers of people who don't want to shake things up for fear of losing what they have just gained. These cautious people, combined with the undereducated *praktiki* of an older generation, constitute major obstacles to truly radical economic reforms" (Pye 1990, 10). Thus, we agree with Hauslohner's assertion that "even before Gorbachev's rise to power, much of the ground for radical political-economic reform had

<sup>11</sup> Mr. Gorbachev has been especially careful not to equate democracy with disorder:

Democracy is not opposed to order. On the contrary, it is order of a higher level, being based not on unquestioning obedience, the mindless execution of instructions, but on the active participation of members of society in all affairs. Democracy is not the opposite of discipline. On the contrary, it is conscious discipline and organization of people's work, the foundation of which is the sense of being a real master of the country, together with collectivism and the solidarity of the interests of efforts of all citizens. Democracy is not the opposite of responsibility, not the absence of control or the permitting of everything. On the contrary, it is self-control on the part of society, based on faith in the civic maturity and understanding of social duty of Soviet people; it is the unity of rights and duties. (Pravda, February 26, 1987, 1-2, quoted in Brown, 1989, 24).

already been prepared and, indeed, that far-reaching changes in one form or another could scarcely be avoided" (1989, 78).

Thus, we believe that Soviet political culture—though perhaps historically not very democratic—has been evolving throughout the last couple of decades. If this is the case, then we should be able to find some evidence of at least a nascent democratic political culture within the Soviet Union.

Following a long tradition, our approach in this research is to examine political culture through a survey of mass public opinion. Since western-oriented surveys in the USSR are a relatively recent phenomenon, it is perhaps useful to digress for a moment to consider the degree to which survey questions on democratic values can elicit valid and reliable responses in the Soviet Union. Indeed, inasmuch as the context we are studying is the USSR, it is perhaps necessary to consider whether surveys of public opinion in that country can elicit *any* useful information.

#### RESEARCH DESIGN AND THE SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The results we report here are drawn from a survey of residents of the Moscow *Oblast*.<sup>12</sup> The survey was conducted from February 17, 1990, through March 4, 1990. A total of 504 Soviet citizens 16 years old or older was interviewed. The sample was selected using multistage probability selection methods (see appendix A for details). The fieldwork was directed by Polina Kozyreva and Gennady Denisovsky of the Institute of Sociology, USSR Academy of Sciences. Unlike many Soviet surveys, the interviews were conducted face-to-face in the homes of the respondents. The respondents were not told that the survey was in any way connected with a United States research project.

Do Soviet people respond candidly to interviewers posing difficult and sometimes sensitive questions? It is of course impossible to address this question definitively. There is, however, a variety of circumstantial evidence suggesting that the answers of the respondents were relatively truthful. One way to assess the quality of the responses is to ask the *interviewers* to evaluate each respondent. We did so with a question that asked about the honesty and openness of the responses. Since the same technique was used in a 1987 U.S. survey, we can compare the Soviet results with American findings.<sup>13</sup>

Nearly all of the American respondents (96%) were perceived by the interviewers as being relatively open. While 80% of the Soviet respondents were

<sup>12</sup> Scientific polling has been conducted in the USSR for nearly three decades now. For a review of earlier research on public opinion in the USSR see Mickiewicz 1972–1973 and 1983 (especially footnote 6, 103); Connor 1977; Welsh 1981; and Slider 1985, 1990.

<sup>13</sup> The U.S. survey was conducted under the direction of James L. Gibson, University of Houston. That survey was a national panel design, with interviews in the spring and summer of 1987. In-person interviews were conducted with a sample drawn through area-probability methods.

similarly perceived, one-fifth were judged to be not as honest and open as most respondents. These findings are reassuring both in that the great majority of respondents was perceived as answering relatively honestly, and, as should be expected, there was less openness in the USSR than in the United States. Data such as these are far from definitive, but do suggest that the quality of the responses is reasonably high.

Survey respondents are notorious for fabricating opinions even when they do not have them (e.g., Schuman and Presser 1981). They do so largely because of the desire not to appear ill-informed or uncooperative. Consequently, one threat to the veracity of the data is this tendency to give answers to questions about which the respondent has no true opinions. We can assess the magnitude of this effect using a question that asks about feelings toward a *fictitious* group. The respondents were asked whether they felt positively or negatively toward "Kalakshists"—a group that does not exist. In the introduction to the question (which asked about 11 groups), the respondents were told to indicate if they have no opinion toward the group. The 1987 U.S. survey used a similar technique, asking the respondents about "The Society for a New America."<sup>14</sup> In the U.S. survey, 30% of the respondents expressed a view toward the fictitious group, with the rest offering no opinion. In the Moscow survey, fully 81% claimed no opinion toward Kalakshists, while another 8% expressed "neutrality" toward the group. Thus, less than 11% expressed a view toward the fictitious group. Again, these data are not definitive but they certainly suggest a level of candor—perhaps due to a keen sense of citizen duty (see Shlapentokh 1989)—among the Soviet respondents that is reasonably high.

We find little evidence in the survey that people were expressing views that they thought the government or anyone else would like to hear. For instance, on many issues the respondents were willing to give strongly anti-regime responses. Thus, while we are mindful that survey results must always be treated cautiously, there are many reasons to believe that democratic values can be studied successfully in the Soviet Union using standard survey research methods.

<sup>14</sup> "Kalakshists" is actually fictitious word that was derived from one of Gennady Denisovsky's metro stops in Moscow. Unfortunately, however, we later discovered that the name sounds something like "Salashists," the name of a group of World War II Hungarian fascists. This is also the name the Soviet media applied to the reformers in the 1956 Hungarian uprising. To the extent that these respondents remember anything about the Hungarian group (and we doubt that many do), they are cuing on a *very* explicitly political group. This, by the way, is why those who actually responded toward the group, responded overwhelmingly negatively.

We cannot claim that Kalakshists are strictly comparable to the Society for a New America. No comparison is ever perfect—this is just one bit of evidence that we marshal within a larger argument about the candor of the respondents.

At a second point in the Soviet questionnaire, we asked about their level of confidence in "Kukhterists," another fictitious group. Fully 81% expressed no opinion toward the group.

Public opinion obviously responds to the events of the times. Given the fast-changing pace of Soviet politics, it is important to locate the date of this survey in historical perspective. By January 1990 most observers agreed that the economic reforms of *perestroika* had failed. Much of the blame was laid at the feet of the communist party (Talbot 1990). Just a few weeks before our survey (February 15, 1990) the Central Committee of the party had approved a draft resolution emasculating the politburo and endorsing the creation of a powerful (on paper) presidential system of government. The print media were largely unfettered by state supervision (although complaints about newsprint shortages were widely aired), and the electronic media were much more open than in the past. Gorbachev was still six months away from winning the Nobel prize. The non-Baltic republics were just beginning to aggressively assert their claims of greater independence. The conservative challenge to democratic reforms was not yet a defining feature of the political landscape, and there was little discussion of the possibility of a coup d'état. In short, there was still some euphoria over the new political rights, but it was intermingled with growing despair about economic reform. It is important to keep his context in mind when interpreting our findings.

#### SOVIET SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND INSTITUTIONS

We have identified seven major subdimensions of basic democratic rights and liberties, including: (1) political tolerance, (2) valuation of liberty, (3) support for the norms of democracy, (4) rights consciousness, (5) support for dissent, (6) support for an independent media, and (7) support for the institution of competitive elections. We will consider each in turn.

##### *Political Tolerance*

No single democratic value has received as much attention from empirical theorists as has political tolerance. Beginning during the unhappy days of McCarthyism in the United States (see Stouffer 1955) and continuing until the present (e.g., Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; Sniderman 1974; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; McClosky and Brill 1983; Gibson and Bingham 1985; Sullivan et al. 1985; Barnum and Sullivan 1989; Gibson 1989; Duch and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Duch 1991b; Sniderman et al. 1991), scholarly interest has focused on the question of whether citizens will tolerate political activity by their most-hated opponents. Tolerance is typically thought to be an essential ingredient of democratic politics. Without tolerance, widespread contestation is impossible, regime legitimacy is imperiled, and a numbing conformity prevails.

How tolerant are residents of the Moscow *Oblast* of their political enemies? Following the lead of Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), we have

allowed the respondents to select target groups for themselves, thereby satisfying the definitional condition that tolerance refers to putting up with that which is objectionable.<sup>15</sup> This “least-liked” measurement strategy asks the survey respondents to identify groups active in politics that are greatly disliked. Thus, we are not so interested in the groups per se as we are in insuring that the group stimulus for the tolerance questions is highly disliked. So as to allow for at least some ideological diversity in the groups (cf. Gibson 1989), we asked about the two most-disliked groups (drawn from either our own list of groups or from groups nominated by the respondent herself/himself). Each respondent was then asked a series of four tolerance questions about each of these two most-disliked groups.<sup>16</sup> Table 1 reports the distribution of groups that the Soviets themselves nominate as extremely disliked.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of table 1 is the lack of consensus among these respondents over these groups. While neo-Nazis are by far the most disliked group, only one-third of the subjects names them as most disliked, and only slightly more than one-half lists neo-Nazis as among the two most disliked groups. The second most disliked group is homosexuals, a somewhat surprising finding in light of the seriousness of the political problems facing the country these days. Nationalist groups are nearly as disliked. Stalinists and supporters of military government are the only other groups named as either most or second-most disliked by at least 20% of the sample. While we must be careful not to assume that failure to list a group in this category means the respondents are favorable toward the group—additional data on group affect definitely do not support such an inference—there is a fair amount of idiosyncrasy in whom residents of the Moscow *Oblast* dislike the most.

<sup>15</sup> An alternative means of assessing intolerance in the USSR is to focus on a fixed target of intolerance. The primary advantage of doing so is that a simple comparison can be made to findings from other countries based on an identical stimulus. The group we used is “fascists.” Though the stimulus might not carry exactly the same meaning in all countries, it is nonetheless useful to compare how Soviets react to this widely despised political minority. Levels of tolerance of fascists are considerably lower in Moscow than they are in western Europe. For instance, less than 5% of the residents of the Moscow *Oblast* would not allow fascists, compared to an EC average of nearly 28%. Indeed, residents of the Moscow *Oblast* are even more intolerant of fascists than are West Germans, the most intolerant people in western Europe. According to the tolerance scale means, there is no country in the EC that is as intolerant as residents of the Moscow *Oblast*.

We must, of course, be cautious about this conclusion, noting especially the problems of generalizing from a Moscow survey to the USSR, and the problem of the differing meanings of the “fascist” stimulus in the different countries. For a further analysis of political intolerance in the USSR see Gibson and Duch 1991b, and in the EC, Gibson and Duch 1991d, and Duch and Gibson 1992.

<sup>16</sup> For an assessment of validity and reliability of the “least-liked” measurement strategy see Gibson 1992.

TABLE 1  
DISTRIBUTION OF DISLIKED POLITICAL GROUPS, MOSCOW OBLAST,  
1990

Group	Distribution of Opinion	
	Most Disliked	Second Most Disliked
Neo-Nazis	34.2	22.0
Homosexuals	15.4	10.8
Nationalists	14.3	18.5
Stalinists	9.8	15.4
Supporters of Canceling Elections and Introducing Military Dictatorship	9.3	15.8
Members of Cooperatives	5.2	5.6
Members of Right-Wing, Pro-Slavic Groups (e.g., the group "Pamyat")	2.9	5.2
Believers	2.7	1.7
Jews	2.7	1.9
Communists	2.7	1.9
Kalakshists*	0.0	0.4
Other	0.8	0.8

Note: Approximate *N*'s are 500.

\*This is a fictitious group.

This distribution of groups seems to be "pluralistic"—that is, there seems to be little consensus that a single group represents any overwhelming threat to the Soviet system. This is in contrast to countries in which there is widespread agreement about what constitutes the major threat to society (e.g., like Israel, where there is much greater agreement on target groups [Shamir and Sullivan 1983], or, presumably, like the United States in the 1950s, when Communists were nearly universally thought to pose a serious threat [e.g., Gibson 1988]). The distribution is similar, however, to that of the contemporary United States (Gibson 1989). The implication of pluralistic intolerance is that intolerance seems to be distributed so broadly that the threat it poses to liberty is neutralized. That is, there seems to be no agreement among these respondents about the appropriate targets of repression. Some would limit the rights of neo-Nazis, but others would attack Stalinists, and still others would focus on homosexuals. According to Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), this is a relatively benign distribution; it bespeaks a type of intolerance in the USSR that is unlikely to be mobilized for the purposes of repressing dissenters, or so it seems.

Some care must be taken with this conclusion, however, because, as we have clearly seen on the question of tolerance of fascists (see footnote 15),

there is a broad consensus among the respondents that fascists ought *not* to be allowed to participate in the political process. Indeed, it is a bit sobering to note that while the distribution in table 1 seems to imply that intolerance is unfocused, our analysis of the data on tolerance for fascists suggests exactly the opposite conclusion. As some have argued before, the finding of pluralistic intolerance may be in part a function of the structure of the questions, rather than the structure of opinion in the polity.

Table 2 reports levels of tolerance of the two most disliked groups using standard questions concerning political activities by the target group. When asked about whether these groups should be allowed to engage in basic political activities, large majorities reply "nyet." By virtually any standard, there is simply not much political tolerance in Moscow. The maximum percentage of subjects giving a tolerant response to any of these questions is 26%, and it involves a speech by the group. Only relatively small minorities would tolerate any given activity by the two most disliked groups, and only a tiny few would allow her or his most disliked groups to engage in all of these political activities.<sup>17</sup>

How much tolerance is necessary for a democracy to function? This is a question that is virtually impossible to answer on the basis of rigorous empirical evidence. Is the relatively high level of intolerance among residents of the Moscow *Oblast* an impediment to democratization? On the basis of the evidence presented here, we conclude that it most likely is. Political tolerance is clearly a scarce commodity in Moscow. Moreover, the sorts of groups that are named as among the most disliked are far from being terrorist or even extremist groups. With the possible exception of neo-Nazis and supporters of military dictatorship (and perhaps homosexuals), all of the other groups are legitimate competitors for political power in the USSR. That tolerance for the political rights of nationalists or even Stalinists is so low is worrisome from the viewpoint of democratic theory—it suggests that willingness to allow one's political opponents the opportunity to compete for political power is not a central part of the political culture in the USSR.<sup>18</sup> Tolerance is something that must be learned by the Soviet people if democratization is to proceed to a full conclusion.

At the same time, perhaps this measure imposes too high a standard of tolerance for a political system in which intolerance toward enemies of the

<sup>17</sup> Virtually identical questions were asked of a sample of Americans in the United States in 1987 (see Gibson 1989). A comparison of the U.S. and Moscow data reveals that Americans are considerably more tolerant than are residents of the Moscow *Oblast*. The percentage of respondents who give a tolerant response for each of the items is nearly twice as high in the United States as in Moscow, although the percentage who would tolerate all of the activities is roughly the same.

<sup>18</sup> Note for instance that on May 21, 1990, the Soviet Parliament enacted a law making "indecent" insults of the Soviet president a crime punishable for a prison term (Celestine Bohlen, *New York Times*, May 23, 1990).

TABLE 2  
LEVELS OF TOLERANCE, MOSCOW OBLAST, 1990

Activity	Group Affect	
	Most Disliked	Second Most Disliked
Not Allowed to Make a Speech	27.0*	27.2
Not Allowed to Hold Public Rallies	17.4	18.8
Should Be Outlawed	16.8	21.4
Banned from Running for Public Office	15.5	14.9
Tolerate All Activities	6.3	5.5

\*Entries are percent tolerant. Approximate *N*'s are 500.

state has long been strongly *encouraged*. Moreover, if intolerance is ever to break out in a polity, it is during times of economic and political crisis, such as the crisis in which the USSR is currently enveloped. The key issue is perhaps not whether relatively unpopular groups should be allowed to participate in politics, but is instead whether *even relatively popular* oppositionist groups should be allowed to participate. Thus, it is perhaps prudent to reserve judgment on levels of support for general democratic values until we consider some additional data.<sup>19</sup>

### *Valuation of Liberty*

Central to virtually all definitions of democracy is individual liberty. Not only must the power of democratic states be constrained, but democracies require guaranteed opportunities for citizens—individually or in groups—to compete for political power. Individual liberty is the ability to vie for power and is an important lubricant for the machinery of democracy.

How much do residents of the Moscow *Oblast* value individual liberty? We can address this question by considering their reactions to a set of items measuring support for liberty within the context of potential social disorder. It is of course not very useful to ask simply whether liberty is of any value to the respondent. Instead, we posed questions that postulated a conflict between liberty and order. We hypothesize that democracies require citizenries committed to liberty even when there is a prospect for disorder. Table 3 reports the responses of the Moscow sample to these questions.

There is evidence in table 3 that these respondents do indeed value political liberty. A large majority of the respondents *disagrees* with the statement

<sup>19</sup> For purposes of our analysis below, we have created an index of tolerance from the data reported in table 2. The index measures tolerance of the two most-disliked groups on the four different types of political activity. Cronbach's alpha for the eight items is .85.

TABLE 3

## SUPPORT FOR THE VALUE OF LIBERTY, MOSCOW OBLAST, 1990

Item	Percent Supporting Liberty	Factor Loading
Society shouldn't have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority. (Disagree)	69.4	.61
Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and extremist political groups shouldn't be allowed to demonstrate. (Disagree)	55.9	.55
Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist political views. (Disagree)	55.0	.53
It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive. (Disagree)	28.0	.58

Note: The nature of the "pro-democratic" response to these items is shown in parentheses. Approximate *N*'s are 500.

that society should not have to put up with those who differ fundamentally on political issues. Similarly, a majority values free speech even if it means freedom for extremists, and supports the right to demonstrate even when there is a possibility of disorder. Perhaps reflecting the turmoil in the contemporary USSR, only a relatively small minority directly prefers freedom over disruption and disorder. Certainly from the perspective of the evidence above on political intolerance in Moscow, these data suggest relatively strong support for the sort of individual liberty that is so useful to democratic politics. From the viewpoint of traditional descriptions of Soviet political culture (e.g., Brown 1989), this level of support for liberty even when associated with disorder is somewhat surprising.

Table 3 also reports the results from a common factor analysis of these items. The purpose of the factor analysis is to construct an index measuring the degree to which the respondents value freedom. As the table reports, each of these items loads fairly strongly on the single factor that emerged from the analysis.<sup>20</sup> Factor scores from the factor analysis will serve as the index of valuation of liberty in the analysis that follows.

<sup>20</sup> The eigenvalue of the first factor extracted 1.97, accounting for 49.3% of the original variance. The eigenvalue of the second factor extracted is .78, *N* = 501. Cronbach's alpha for these items is .66.

*Support for Democratic Norms*

Relying on Prothro and Grigg (1960); Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979, 1982); and Sullivan et al. (1985) have developed a scale they designate as support for the "norms of democracy." This scale is one of the best predictors of political tolerance, and in some ways is meant to represent abstract commitments to the values that are implemented in the concrete tolerance scale. We have asked the Moscow sample how they feel about these statements and their responses are shown in table 4.

At the relatively abstract level, residents of the Moscow *Oblast* are strongly committed to democratic values. Nearly everyone agrees that people should be treated equally irrespective of their political views, and that everyone should be allowed to express herself or himself freely. Even on matters of whether basic rights before the law should be suspended under serious circumstances, a large majority of the respondents endorses the democratic values.

Thus, we see a pattern in the Moscow data that is quite similar to that in U.S. data. Citizens fairly strongly endorse general formulations of democratic values, but many fail to support the application of the values to specific, conflictual cases. It appears from the data considered so far that the gap between general and specific beliefs in the USSR is large. Perhaps this is a reflection of a more general gap between ideology and reality in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there is a remarkable amount of consensus in Moscow about fundamental democratic values, at least in principle.

Table 4 also reports a factor analysis of these items. The two statements concerning free speech for everyone load strongly on the factor, while the two items concerning procedural justice are more moderately related to the factor. Though Sullivan et al. (1985) have split the norms of democracy concept into two subdimensions—ones that approximate the structure in our factor analysis results—our factor analysis reveals only a single significant factor.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, we have decided to use only the factor scores from that factor in our analysis.

*Rights Consciousness*

Another important dimension of democratic values is what we term "rights consciousness" (see Gibson and Duch 1990a). This is the degree to which citizens are willing to assert rights for themselves. To the extent that citizens are vigilant about their rights, democracy tends to flourish. In autocratic political systems, it is not the citizen who defines and claims her or his rights,

<sup>21</sup> The eigenvalue for the first factor from the common factor analysis is 1.92 and the factor accounts for 47.9% of the item variance. The eigenvalue of the second factor is .98,  $N = 502$ . Cronbach's alpha for the items is .61.

TABLE 4

## SUPPORT FOR THE NORMS OF DEMOCRACY, MOSCOW OBLAST, 1990

Item	Percent Supporting Democratic Value	Factor Loading
No matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else. (Agree)	93.8	.65
It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express themselves freely. (Agree)	89.5	.71
When the country is in great danger we may have to force people to testify against themselves even if this violates their civil rights. (Disagree)	74.6	-.48
If someone is suspected of treason or other serious crimes, he can be sent to prison without trial. (Disagree)	72.8	-.37

Note: The nature of the "democratic" response to these items is shown in parentheses. Approximate *N*'s are 500.

but it is instead the government that extends rights to the citizen. Russian political culture has often been described as one in which citizens do not acquire rights by entitlement, but rather through the beneficence of the state. Characterizing pre-Soviet Russian culture, White wrote: "In Russia . . . it was considered entirely proper that the government should assume responsibility for all aspects of a citizen's welfare, moral as well as material, and that it should establish such rules as it saw fit for the purpose" (White 1979, 33). The enumeration of the rights of citizens is one of the prerogatives that the government claimed for itself.<sup>22</sup>

But how specifically can we argue that a citizenry cognizant of its rights

<sup>22</sup> The role of rights consciousness in democratic political cultures has received only limited attention from comparative scholars. Almond and Verba (1963), for example, never explicitly address the issue of rights consciousness. However, they nonetheless incorporate a surrogate for rights consciousness in their measure of "subjective political competence," which they present as a prerequisite to democratic politics. One element of "subjective political competence" is the expectation that citizens will receive equal treatment from governmental authorities. In other words, citizens in democratic political cultures develop a conception of certain rights vis-à-vis governmental authorities: they expect to be treated just as other citizens in the polity are treated (Almond and Verba 1963, 106). A rights-conscious citizenry also represents an important check on the exercise of arbitrary power by governmental authorities (Almond and Verba 1963, 483), and, of course, arbitrary power is anathema to democracy. The authors find that this rights consciousness was higher in the more mature democracies, the United States and the U.K., and less well developed in the newer democracies, Mexico and Italy.

contributes to democratic government? Our view is that rights consciousness contributes to democracy because it results in greater demands by the citizenry for the advancement and protection of individual and collective political, social, and economic rights. Democracies are not well served by passive citizens who are unwilling to assert their rights against intrusions by governmental and nongovernmental institutions (Gibson and Duch 1991c). To the extent that the authority of the government is too readily accepted, democracy is threatened. One of the most important aspects of the authority relationships between governments and the governed concerns the rights that citizens claim for themselves (cf. Eckstein 1966). High levels of rights consciousness constrain institutions within democracies; they define citizens as active participants in governance, not as passive recipients of governance.

We have asked the Moscow respondents to indicate whether a series of rights ought always to be protected, or whether it depends on the circumstances. We hypothesize that democracies prosper when citizens are more jealous of their rights. The responses of the Soviets, as well as the responses of western Europeans in a 1988 survey, are shown in table 5.<sup>23</sup>

With just a few exceptions, the figures in table 5 are remarkably similar for the Soviets and western Europeans. For instance, 77% of the residents of the Moscow *Oblast* asserted that freedom of speech ought to be protected always, compared to an EC average of 78%. The Soviets look uncannily like their Western neighbors in terms of their willingness to assert basic citizenship rights.

The few significant differences between the Soviet respondents and the western Europeans are also interesting. For instance, the Soviets place less emphasis on freedom of association, perhaps reflecting their long history of a lack of voluntary interest groups and political parties. Another substantial difference is in the right to cultural autonomy ("the right of people to their own language and culture")—the Soviets are more jealous of this right than the western Europeans. This too makes sense given the extraordinary range of cultural diversity within the Soviet Union.

Roughly one-third of these respondents laid claim to all the rights about which they were queried. This places the Soviet Union as among the more rights conscious polities of Europe. When compared to the established democracies of Western Europe—and especially to the United Kingdom, for instance—the level of rights consciousness in the USSR is remarkably high.

We suspect that rights consciousness is highest among citizens who have been subjected to arbitrary government. Consequently, it is not altogether

<sup>23</sup> For comparative purposes, we report data from our earlier analysis of the responses of western Europeans to these questions (see Gibson and Duch 1990).

TABLE 5

## RIGHTS CONSCIOUSNESS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE MOSCOW OBLAST

	United		The Nether-				Luxem-				All			
	France	Kingdom	Germany	Italy	lands	Denmark	Belgium	bourg	Ireland	Greece	Spain	Portugal	EC	Moscow
Freedom of Speech	75.9	67.5	89.7	76.5	74.9	74.9	71.4	85.8	70.4	89.0	81.0	84.1	78.4	77.0
Personal Safety	77.2	91.6	92.8	89.9	85.1	86.5	79.3	91.1	93.7	93.1	92.0	94.4	88.8	92.9
Freedom of Association	59.7	67.2	61.9	61.6	59.1	63.8	57.5	80.6	60.8	70.8	79.7	80.3	64.9	50.0
Cultural Autonomy	82.2	64.4	85.9	91.5	66.8	71.0	71.4	87.1	90.4	93.3	90.4	96.5	82.0	93.3
Freedom of Conscience	79.5	80.8	88.6	90.5	91.9	80.8	75.0	88.2	89.1	92.2	88.5	92.8	85.9	91.7
Equality before the Law	92.1	69.8	95.1	97.1	90.1	92.5	85.5	96.3	75.3	96.0	95.6	94.0	90.0	95.6
Right of Asylum	73.8	41.8	39.1	55.4	27.2	27.0	50.1	57.7	52.9	79.4	80.4	80.7	55.1	—
Right to Work	95.9	87.3	85.3	98.5	84.4	78.4	86.5	95.6	96.4	95.2	98.5	98.3	91.9	93.7
Right to Property	79.2	81.5	86.2	78.4	75.0	75.5	76.5	92.9	85.1	90.6	85.5	88.2	82.0	90.7
Right to Education	95.6	95.9	92.1	97.6	96.5	87.3	90.0	96.3	98.1	95.5	99.0	97.5	95.5	95.0
Freedom of Information	91.5	61.8	85.9	93.3	79.1	81.9	83.9	94.3	73.9	94.3	95.3	97.3	85.1	83.3
Right to Privacy	95.7	89.2	94.7	95.5	94.9	97.9	87.1	97.0	90.7	94.2	96.7	94.8	94.1	80.6
Right to Travel Abroad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	71.0
Percent Claiming All Rights	26.8	9.5	26.8	26.7	11.7	11.1	19.4	34.2	21.4	48.3	42.0	56.3	25.7	36.3

Note: Entries are the percentage of respondents asserting that the right ought to always be respected.

surprising to find that rights consciousness in the Soviet Union approximates the levels found in the newly democratized countries of western Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece).

Thus, to the extent that democracies depend on citizens who are willing to assert rights, the political culture of the Soviet Union may well contribute to the development of more limited government and greater popular sovereignty. The evidence shows that ordinary Soviets view themselves as entitled to just as many rights as do citizens in the more established democracies.<sup>24</sup>

### *Support for Dissent*

In a democratic political system, citizens must be able to challenge the actions of government and to dissent from those they find objectionable. In more autocratic systems, dissent and disagreement are constrained. Just as citizens do not assert a "right to rights" in such systems, they do not make a basic claim to disagree with the government. Given the tradition in much of Soviet history of citizens adopting a relatively passive role, we would not expect to find very widespread endorsement for the notion that citizens ought to be able to disagree with their government. We have measured support for dissent through a set of items borrowed from the World Values Survey. The responses to these questions are shown in table 6.

Generally speaking, there is fairly broad support for dissent among residents of the Moscow *Oblast*. Nearly everyone agrees that the government should be more open to the public, and a healthy majority agrees that citizens should be able to form groups to oppose the legal status quo, and that the government should allow individuals more freedom. Even in terms of the broadest statement of disagreement, two-thirds of the sample disagrees that political reform is progressing too rapidly. Thus, there appears to be sufficient support for democratic style dissent to flourish.

We have created a scale measuring the general propensity to support dissent by factor analyzing the responses to these four items. A single dominant factor emerged from the analysis.<sup>25</sup> With the possible exception of the general item about political reform, each of these seems to be an acceptable indicator of the concept, so factor scores from this analysis will serve as our general measure of support for dissent.

<sup>24</sup> As an index of "rights consciousness" we have taken the average of the responses to these 12 items. We have scored "don't know" as between "always be respected" and "depends on the circumstances."

<sup>25</sup> The eigenvalue for the first factor from the common factor analysis is 1.69 and the factor accounts for 42.2% of the item variance. The eigenvalue of the second factor is .89,  $N = 502$ . Alpha is .52.

TABLE 6

## SUPPORT FOR THE VALUE OF DISSENT, MOSCOW OBLAST, 1990

Item	Percent Supporting Dissent	Factor Loading
Our government should become much more open to the public. (Agree)	93.1	.56
Political reform in this country is moving too rapidly. (Disagree)	68.0	-.32
People should be able to participate in any organization even if this activity opposes some current laws. (Agree)	61.0	.49
We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows more freedom for individuals to do as they wish. (Agree)	52.8	.55

Note: The nature of the "pro-dissent" response to these items is shown in parentheses. Approximate *N*'s are 500.

### *Support for Independent Media*

The need for an independent media in democracies is obvious. Media that are dependent upon the government—either due to direct censorship or even through political control of the allocation of paper—cannot serve as a check on arbitrary and autocratic government. Support for a vigorous, pluralistic media is an important component of basic democratic values.

The Soviets we surveyed have quite ambivalent views toward their media (see table 7). On one hand, there is widespread agreement that there is *too much* criticism in the contemporary press. On the other hand, nearly everyone agrees that the press ought to be protected from government persecution, and a slight majority supports the idea of both public and private media. There is no clear conclusion about Soviet attitudes toward the press that emerges from table 7.

The factor analysis results are also a bit confused. Only a single factor emerges from the analysis,<sup>26</sup> but this is hardly surprising given that only a small number of items is being analyzed. The factor loading for at least one of the three items is quite weak. We suspect that the last item is not a particularly useful measure of attitudes toward media independence because the item does not call for a conclusion about what ought to be done about excessive criticism. One possible democratic interpretation of the responses to

<sup>26</sup> The eigenvalue for the first factor from the common factor analysis is 1.29 and the factor accounts for 42.9% of the item variance. The eigenvalue of the second factor is .95, *N* = 504. Alpha is .31.

TABLE 7  
SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MEDIA, MOSCOW OBLAST, 1990

Item	Percent Supporting Independent Media	Factor Loading
The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the government. (Agree)	90.4	.37
Private radios, television, and newspapers should exist alongside state-owned media. (Agree)	54.6	.61
There is currently too much criticism in Soviet newspapers and magazines. (Disagree)	28.8	-.19

Note: The nature of the "pro-media independence" response to these items is shown in parentheses. Approximate *N*'s are 500.

this item is that these respondents are supportive of more *self*-restraint in the media, even while opposing government persecution of those who fail to restrain themselves. The first item suffers in this analysis from degenerate variance, and this may well account for its modest loading on the factor. Thus, the factor score that results from this analysis must be understood as overwhelmingly dominated by the question of whether a private press ought to co-exist with the state-owned media. Though we do not necessarily argue that democracies require privately owned media, in the case of the contemporary Soviet Union, this survey item is probably a reasonably good indicator of support for media pluralism. To the extent that this is so, there is not a consensus among residents of the Moscow *Oblast* in favor of pluralism.

#### *Popular Support for the Institution of Competitive Elections*

Any list of characteristics defining democracy must include elections (Dahl 1971; Sartori 1986). As Dennis (1970, 819) notes, "if any single institution serves as popular democracy's *sine qua non* it is that of elections." Indeed, some have even gone so far as to equate democracy with competitive elections. According to Huntington (1984, 195), "[a] political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."

Ideally, the choice in competitive elections is between two or more parties—less ideally between two or more candidates in a one-party circumstance. Most students of elections do not believe policy choices are possible

(or at least easy) when elections limit choice to candidates without the benefit of differing party labels (MacKenzie 1958). Candidate choice systems can be effective as a check on the personal competence of the office holder, particularly in terms of being able to deliver services to the constituency. But such elections are considerably less effective in mandating public policy. In MacKenzie's (1958) words, lack of parties means "muddled choice" and without party labels the options to voters are not spelled out with clarity.

In the Soviet setting there is good reason to question the level of support for competitive elections.<sup>27</sup> First, there is little tradition in the USSR of popular influence on government. It is often argued that the political culture of the Soviet Union is rooted in centuries of absolutism, absent a liberal or democratic tradition. Representative institutions have been generally weak, ineffective, and nonresponsive to mass input. Moreover, in recent years the Soviet public has become increasingly cynical toward the acclamatory electoral structure. Writing in 1987, Harrop and Miller (1987) argue that the available evidence indicates that the Soviet citizenry views elections with indifference, cynicism, or contempt. Zaslavsky and Brym (1978) observe that nonvoting is more widespread than previously thought. Despite intense pressures on the part of party organizers to get everyone to the polls, turnout is closer to 75% than the officially proclaimed 99% plus. Based on the SIP data, Bahry and Silver (1990) reported that 80% of the respondents said they "always voted." People vote not because they want to, but because it is easier to vote than not to vote. Cynicism toward the old acclamatory electoral structure may carry over to the somewhat changed structure currently in place.

The Moscow data include six items relevant to support for competitive elections in the USSR. Some of these items imply competitive elections, others refer specifically to competition between political parties. The frequency distribution for the six items is reported in table 8.

The responses to these items are sharply skewed in the direction of support for competitive elections. Opposition is generally no more than 10% to 15%, with another 10% to 25% being uncertain. For every item, more than two-thirds of the sample support electoral competition. Whatever the level

<sup>27</sup> At the time of this survey, the move toward competitive elections in the USSR was in its infancy. On December 1, 1988, a new electoral law was adopted which made it clear that the number of candidates should ordinarily exceed the number of seats. Article 37 of the new law allowed for an unlimited number of candidates to be put forward to contest seats for legislative bodies. The principle was first applied to the 1989 elections for the newly formed Congress of People's Deputies. This institution has 2,250 deputies, 1,500 of which are popularly elected and 750 elected by "public organizations" (such as the Communist party, scientific organizations, and trade unions). The public organizations fielded 880 candidates for 750 positions. In the popularly elected constituencies there were 2,895 candidates for 1,500 seats, but in 384 of the constituencies there was but a single candidate. Turnout was 90%. Members of the Communist party won 85% of the seats (White 1990).

TABLE 8

## SUPPORT FOR COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS, MOSCOW OBLAST, 1990

Item	Percent Supporting Competitive Elections	Factor Loading
Elections to local Soviets should be conducted in such a way that there are several candidates for each post. (Agree)	95.0	-.47
It is necessary to ban elections and allow the CPSU to rule the country (without elections). (Disagree)	84.9	.62
Political parties other than the Communist party should be legalized. (Agree)	77.3	-.67
Those supporting competitive elections are doing harm to the country. (Disagree)	71.9	.60
Competition between the Communist party and other parties will improve the way the authorities work in the Soviet Union. (Agree)	68.5	-.55
A one-party system in the USSR promotes the development of democracy. (Disagree)	68.5	.75

Note: The nature of the "pro-competitive elections" response to these items is shown in parentheses. Approximate *N*'s are 500.

of cynicism that may have existed for the acclamatory electoral structure, it does not manifest itself in response to the items in the Moscow survey. Nor does the Russia authoritarian tradition seem to have had any overall dampening effect on the enthusiasm for electoral competition. By virtually any comparative or absolute standard, support for competitive elections in March 1990 is adequate to maintain the institution at the mass level (see also Tedin 1991).

Also presented in table 8 are the loadings from a common factor analysis of the six items. Our summary indicator of support for competitive elections will consist of factor scores based on these six items.<sup>28</sup>

### *The Interrelatedness of Democratic Subdimensions*

We have implicitly been arguing that these seven sets of attitudes are part of a more general belief system. That is, we suspect that the scales we have

<sup>28</sup> Reliability for the scale (alpha) is .78. The common factor analysis explained 47.9% of the item variance, and the eigenvalue of the initial factor was 2.87. The eigenvalue of the second factor is .86, *N* = 501.

created are themselves intercorrelated. If so, it is useful to think of a more general attitude toward democratic values, one that contributes to the responses to the various subdimensions we have considered earlier.

Figure 1 reports the results from factor analyzing the seven democratic values subdimensions. Only a single dominant factor emerged from this factor analysis, accounting for 46% of the original variance.<sup>29</sup> Five of the scales load strongly on the factor, and the remaining two scales have more moderate loadings. The scale with the highest loading is support for the institution of competitive elections. Support for the norms of democracy, valuation of liberty, and support for dissent also contribute substantially to the definition of the factor.

The two scales with weaker loadings are rights consciousness and political tolerance. We suspect that the problem with the former is its lack of variance—nearly all of the Moscow respondents claimed a great number of rights, especially the rights most closely connected to democratic participation. The relatively low loading of political tolerance scale is no doubt a function of its more “applied” character. While it is certainly true that many of the other items presented value conflicts to the respondents, the tolerance items are unique in specifying quite concretely the groups and activities that are to be tolerated. Moreover, as we noted above, there is a restricted amount of variance in levels of tolerance in the Moscow sample.


Thus, it does appear that there is a reasonable amount of coherence in the beliefs of these respondents on these various issues. We hesitate to label this a “democratic ideology,” but it is certainly the case that those who tend to support one democratic value tend also to support other democratic values. The seeming coherence of various attitudes toward democratic rights and liberties indicates that these are attitudes that are reasonably well structured within the respondents’ belief systems. For the remainder of this analysis we will use the factor score from figure 1 as the indicator of support for basic democratic rights, liberties, and institutions.

### Summary

How supportive are residents of the Moscow *Oblast* of basic democratic processes and institutions? While the picture that emerges from our analysis is less than crystal clear, generally, there is a remarkable level of support for democracy among these respondents. They are quite willing to claim a variety of rights of citizenship, there is a consensus on democratic principles abstractly formulated, and liberty and dissent are reasonably highly valued. The single most significant exception to the generally broad support for

<sup>29</sup> The eigenvalue of the first extracted factor is 3.19. The eigenvalue of the second factor is .99, and it accounts for only 14% of the variance in the items,  $N = 496$ .

FIGURE 1  
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF CORE DEMOCRATIC BELIEFS



democratic values is on the question of political tolerance for one's most hated political enemies.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES

We have considered earlier several major dimensions of democratic values. In trying to make inferences about the importance of these values for the future of the democratization process in the USSR, we have implicitly been assuming that the views of all citizens are of equal influence. This is obviously not a valid assumption. Consequently, it is important to consider how these values are distributed throughout various strata of Soviet society.

We are interested here in differences in values across several different segments of Soviet society. The strata we consider are defined by: (1) level of education, (2) wealth, (3) gender, (4) age and generations, (5) membership in the Communist party, and (6) opinion leadership. We hypothesize that support for democratic values will be highest among opinion leaders, those with high levels of education, those who are not members of the Communist party, younger Soviets, those from lower socioeconomic classes, and men. Let us consider each of these hypotheses briefly.

*Level of Education*

An overwhelming consensus exists in the democratization literature linking higher education with support for general democratic values (Dahl 1971),

and there is extensive empirical evidence in the developed democracies of this relationship.<sup>30</sup> But most of these findings concern developed democracies in which system norms are strongly supportive of general democratic values. Accordingly, two potential processes may contribute to support for democratic values. First, individuals with higher education are more likely to be exposed to and socialized into accepting officially sanctioned norms promoting democratic values. Second, education may inherently instill or reinforce liberal values such as equality, tolerance, and respect for individual liberties. This distinction is of course quite relevant for the democratization process in the Soviet Union, where system norms have traditionally not supported general democratic values. Thus, there are reasons to expect that the effect of education on democratic values is different in the USSR than it is in the West.

Suggesting that the system norms explanation is more accurate, Weil (1985) has recently argued that the relationship between education and support for democratic values is "weaker, nonexistent, or sometimes even reversed in nonliberal democracies or countries which did not have liberal-democratic regime forms in earlier decades, compared to countries which have been liberal democratic for a long time." Consistent with this argument, it has been widely accepted that Soviet education promotes system norms antithetical to democratic values. Silver (1987), for example, quotes Jeremy Azrael's description of the goals of the Soviet school curriculum:

The ultimate goal of the educational system has been to render terror superfluous by establishing a totalitarian consensus in society and creating a "new man" characterized by the sort of self-control and self-mobilization that would permit the establishment of a wholly "consensual" or "popular" totalitarianism.

On the other hand, evidence from the SIP survey calls into question the system norms explanation, suggesting that in the Soviet Union, education is actually negatively related to support for system norms. Silver (1987) finds that education is *negatively* related to support for regime norms (state ownership and rights of the collective) and that this negative relationship holds up in a multivariate analysis. The implication of this is that education contributes to support for democratic values, regardless of formal system norms. A recent finding by Bahry and Silver (1990), that education is positively related to unconventional political activism and compliant political activism, also suggests that this is the case.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, Gibson and Duch (1992b) have discovered that better educated Soviets are less anti-Semitic.

<sup>30</sup> One of the rare but important dissent in voices on this issue is Jackman (e.g., Jackman and Muha 1984).

<sup>31</sup> Remington argues that the effect of education is important in terms of the ways in which people deal with information: "More education [in the USSR] increases the likelihood that an individual will consume more information from the media, will be critical of the media, and will seek compensatory information from informal social contacts" (1988, 203).

Thus, our expectations about the impact of education on democratic values in the Soviet Union are ambivalent. To the extent that education socializes Soviet citizens to predominantly nondemocratic values, those with more education will be less democratic. But to the extent that more education broadens perspectives, increases stores of information, and generally contributes to respect for diversity and difference, the better educated will be more democratic.

### *Wealth*

We also hypothesize that those who have profited most from the status quo are least likely to want to change it. After all, democratization—as the eastern and central Europeans are learning—is a perilous and tumultuous process. Those who have been economically successful under the existing regime cannot be expected to welcome such risky change. Earlier research has discovered just such an effect. For instance, Silver, analyzing SIP data, discovered that material satisfaction was associated with support for the established political order (Silver 1987). Thus, we expect support for democratization to be weakest among the wealthiest.

Measuring economic positions in the USSR is not exactly easy. Incomes—at least official incomes—tend to be much more equal in the USSR than in the West, therefore not providing a very useful means of differentiating the population. Consequently, we have chosen to measure wealth through a series of questions asking about the ownership of consumer and household goods, ranging from a refrigerator to a color television to an automobile. Our measure of wealth is simply the number of these goods the respondent claims to own. The correlation between this measure of wealth and income is .19.

### *Gender*

Why should we expect gender differences on support for democratic values in the USSR?<sup>32</sup> One possibility is that gender differences found in Western democracies may be reflected in the Soviet Union as well, perhaps due to the common experience of industrialization and modernization. In theory, of course, Soviet leaders since Lenin have claimed to have solved the problem of gender inequalities. But in practice, substantial inequalities still exist.

<sup>32</sup> Gender differences in other areas of social, political, and economic life in the USSR are significant. Positions of political leadership are overwhelmingly dominated by men (e.g., Bohr 1989, 15); salaries for women are less than those for their male counterparts (e.g., Gray 1989, 26); employment opportunities are more limited for women (e.g., Gruzdeva and Chertikhina 1986, 155); and there is even a rigid differentiation in gender roles within the family (e.g., Peers 1985, 124). However, little is currently known about how these broader differences between men and women translate into political attitudes and behavior.

Carnaghan and Bahry (1990, 381) observe “. . . the position of women in the Soviet Union is sufficiently similar to the position of women in the West that it reasonable to think that the findings in the western literature may have parallels among Soviet women,” and they discover a number of important attitudinal differences between male and female Soviet emigres. Women accepting traditional female roles are especially distinctive. Most importantly, Bahry (1987) found women in the SIP were more favorably disposed to the established political order, were less tolerant of political diversity, and were less supportive of democratic norms. Consequently, that is our expectation as well.

We do, however, need a caveat. Although there does not exist a strong feminist movement in the USSR, the objective conditions for women's political consciousness raising certainly exist. Women as a whole are well educated, the vast majority work outside the home, and they live in a society in which the official ideology promotes the equality of the sexes. Thus, gender-based differences may not be large in the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup>

### *The Impact of Age on Democratic Values*

We expect that attitudes toward democratic values in the USSR are influenced by the age of the respondent. More specifically, we hypothesize that younger respondents are more supportive of democratic values than those who are older. Moreover, we expect that the effect of age will be independent of other variables—such as level of education—that are typically related to age.

In her analysis of the SIP data, Bahry (1987) discovered a particularly strong effect of age and generation on the values of Soviet emigres. She concludes: “. . . the turbulence of Soviet history has created divergent political values, levels of activism, and evaluations of the regime among successive generations. Age cleavages extend beyond cultural tastes and preferences; they reflect different orientations to political life” (Bahry 1987, 94). At the same time, the effect of age on attitudes in the USSR is far more than the effect of aging. As White has noted: “It is . . . unlikely, to say the least, that the political beliefs and values of successive generations of Soviet citizens have been unaffected by the different circumstances in which they have been brought up within the USSR and by their different levels of knowledge of the outside world at formative periods in their political maturation” (White 1979, 182). Different generations are distinctive in their views toward a host of political issues, and one of the most important generational dividers is, as might be expected, connected with the era of Stalin. Within

<sup>33</sup> Note also that gender differences may be smaller in this Moscow data set than in the country as a whole. Since we expect men and women to differ most in rural areas, and perhaps in the Moslem parts of the country, our survey surely underestimates these effects.

the emigre data, those who have come of age after Stalin are decidedly more likely to engage in unorthodox political behavior and to hold attitudes consistent with such behavior (see also Carnaghan and Bahry 1990).

One of the most relevant of Bahry's findings is that the younger generation of emigres tends to evaluate the contemporary regime mainly in terms of its present performance. That is, the young seem to be less enamored with the great successes of Soviet socialism throughout the century—especially in contrast to those who profited so greatly from Stalin's Big Deal (Bahry 1987)—and consequently are more critical of the current regime. In the emigre data, the criticism focused on such issues as the "privilege gap" created during the Brezhnev era. We hypothesize that today, the critical tendency will be manifest in attitudes toward democratization. Without a strong sense of history, younger Soviets are expected to be less willing to accept the status quo, and more willing to experiment with new structures and processes. As Bahry asserted: "New generations seem little disposed to measure the regime against a distant past they only dimly recognize" (Bahry 1987, 91).<sup>34</sup>

The effect of age and generations on attitudes may not be as strong, however, in our study of Moscow as it would be were we to analyze a full national sample. In light of the greater cosmopolitanism of city dwellers, especially those living in the capital city, generational difference can become muted because older residents of the Moscow *Oblast* are not so resistant to social change. Thus, we expect a moderate but not strong effect of age on attitudes toward democratization.

### *Communist Party Membership*

Our expectations regarding the impact of Communist party membership on support for democratic values are ambiguous, if not contradictory. On the one hand, the party has often been seen as a vehicle for promoting regime norms (e.g., Remington 1988). Accordingly, we should expect members to be relatively hostile to general democratic values.<sup>35</sup> But on the other hand, as Bahry and Silver (1990) have pointed out, the efforts by authorities to mobilize participation, of which the party was one tool, seem to have promoted the kinds of democratic values typically associated with participation

<sup>34</sup> Though limited in many important respects, there is one emigré study that directly addressed the relationship between age and support for democratic values. White's analysis of a small number of emigres reveals that younger emigres were much more likely to support the principles of freedom of speech and press, freedom of belief, the right to choose one's place of residence, and a multiparty system (White 1978). These are precisely the sorts of expectations we have about our Moscow sample.

<sup>35</sup> Indeed, Remington argues, after reviewing a variety of earlier surveys in the USSR, that party affiliation is the "single strongest factor bearing on opinion . . . ; it outweighs social status, education, age, and gender as a predictor" (1988, 200).

in the developed democracies (see also Duch and Gibson 1991).<sup>36</sup> This suggests a positive relationship between degree of activity in the Communist party and support for general democratic values. On balance, however, we suspect that party membership is associated with disdain for the democratic values under consideration here.

### *Opinion Leadership*

In democratic societies it has long been shown that access to political information can affect both the salience of public issues and to a lesser extent the direction of opinion on those issues (Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Noelle-Neumann 1984). It is now well understood that information does not flow through society in an even fashion. Rather, the diffusion of information tends to proceed in a two-step fashion (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). Citizens who are interested in political events tend to assimilate information from the media as well as a variety of other sources. In the literature on political communications, these people are labeled "opinion leaders" (cf. Weimann 1991). These "opinion leaders" interpret the information received from the media and other sources and directly shape the knowledge and beliefs of others (Almond and Powell 1978). If opinion leaders are more strongly committed to democratic values than ordinary citizens, then democratization is more likely to penetrate Soviet political culture further. It is, therefore, of consequence whether opinion leaders are supportive or skeptical about the process of democratization, since we assume they will be particularly important in the process of developing support. We hypothesize that opinion leaders are more strongly committed to democratic values than ordinary citizens.<sup>37</sup>

The correlations of these variables with our major summary dimension of democratic values are shown in table 9.

### *Analysis*

The first thing that should be noted about table 9 is that these six demographic attributes explain a reasonable portion of the variance in support for the various democratic values—26% of the variance in attitudes can be explained. Apparently, these attitudes reflect in important ways the social attributes of the respondents.

<sup>36</sup> We focus here only on party membership because, as Bahry and Silver (1990) argue on the basis of emigré data, membership in Komsomol is largely ritualistic "disengaged participation," but membership in the Communist party reflects much more conventional activism.

<sup>37</sup> We measure opinion leadership with a single item which reads, "How often do people ask your opinions on political matters—very often, only sometimes, or hardly ever?" Given the tradition in the literature on opinion leaders of treating this group as a small, elite stratum, we recode the variable into two categories (cf. Gibson and Duch 1991a). We characterize nearly 19% of the sample as opinion leaders (those who were asked their opinion "very often").

TABLE 9  
PREDICTORS OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Predictor	Support for Rights, Liberties, and Institutions	
	<i>r</i>	Beta
Opinion Leadership	.12	.05
Level of Education	.41	.36*
Communist Party Membership	-.01	-.07
Age	-.25	-.21*
Ownership of Goods	.17	.04
Gender	-.17	-.14*
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.24*	

Note: Approximate *N*'s are 500.

\*Regression coefficient is significant at .01 or less.

In general, the strongest predictor of democratic attitudes is level of education: those who are better educated tend to be more supportive of democratic rights, liberties, and institutions. This finding suggests that the more highly educated, and typically more influential, elements of Soviet society are likely to be a positive force in the democratization process. It is not the case, as some have suggested (DiFranceis and Gitelman 1984), that educated sectors of society are disaffected and cynical regarding basic democratic values, even if they are disaffected with the status quo. This finding is consistent with much of the extant research on democratization.

Younger respondents tend to be more democratic in their values. This is an intriguing finding which bodes well for the forces of democratization. It is likely that time itself is an ally of those who would change the current system. If we assume that support for democratic values is *not* an aging effect, but is instead a generational or period effect, then death will decimate those who most resist democratic reform. This pattern fits well with generational interpretations of cultural change (Inglehart 1988, 1990). As Eckstein (1988) notes, a sure sign of culture change is generational differences. Changing cultural values will show up first among the younger cohorts. And of course intergenerational replacement will move the process forward as the older cohorts exit society—at least among the mass public.

Within this sample, women tend to be significantly less supportive of democratic values. Note that this difference is independent of the other variables under consideration—that is, controlling for such factors as level of education, women are less supportive of democratic values. We take this as support for the hypothesis that Soviet women tend to be more traditional in orientation, and to be somewhat less willing to risk the social upheaval

that democratization will inevitably bring to the USSR (see also Tedin and Yap, n.d.).

It appears that active membership in the Communist party has not undermined support for general democratic values—members of the Communist party are no less supportive than the members of the general public. Though of course our data say nothing about the leadership of the Communist party, ordinary members of the party are *not* less committed to democratic values than nonmembers.

Within the multivariate analysis opinion leadership has little independent impact on democratic values. Of course, from a purely descriptive standpoint, opinion leaders are slightly more committed to democratic values than are ordinary citizens (i.e.,  $r = .13$ ). Since the opinion leadership variable is related to other variables in the equation, its effect is not statistically significant in the multivariate equation. Thus, opinion leaders are more supportive of democratic values, but perhaps it is due mainly to higher levels of education, etc.

Finally, wealth distinctions do not have an independent impact on democratic values, even though the bivariate relationship is nontrivial. This suggests that the class divisions so common in the West are not particularly salient on matters of democratization in the USSR.

Generally, then, we have discovered that support for democratic values is more prevalent among better educated Soviets, among men, among those who are younger, but is no greater (or lesser) among opinion leaders, among members of the Communist party, and among those with more wealth.

## DISCUSSION

One of the most insightful journalists who regularly reports on the Soviet Union is Bill Keller. The former Moscow Bureau Chief of the *New York Times*, after considering the dramatic structural changes taking place in the USSR, recently observed: "A second fundamental of democracy is a level of political culture—a sense of obligation before the law, a respect for minority rights, a civil etiquette—that is not a part of the public consciousness in the Soviet Union, where democracy is being imposed from above" (Keller 1990, 1). Though we remain agnostic on the question of who is imposing democracy on whom, there is little in the analysis we have presented that supports Keller's observation. Indeed, we have discovered far more support for democratic values in Moscow than we have anticipated. We have found widespread support for the institution of competitive elections, and significant levels of attachment to many democratic rights and liberties. Indeed, there is only one clear instance in which the Soviets seem to reject democratic values—on the acid test of whether to tolerate one's political enemies. In

most other respects, there are few cultural impediments, at least in Moscow, to the further democratization of the USSR.

We have also made some inroads into the question of which segments of Soviet society are most supportive of democratic values. With few exceptions, those (among the mass public) who are most likely to have real influence over processes of change in the future are the most committed to democratic values. This augers well for the future of democracy in the Soviet Union, at least from the viewpoint of the values of ordinary citizens.

The level of support for democratic values in the USSR is quite surprising, leading us to wonder how this can be so. One easy answer is that our Moscow sample is unrepresentative of the USSR as a whole. We cannot generalize these findings beyond that limited geographical unit; nor, given the rapid political change in the USSR, beyond the temporal framework of the study. Moscow is not necessarily representative of the entire country, even if it is perhaps the most politically important area of the country, so we are loathe to overgeneralize these findings. On the other hand, however, we have recently conducted a survey in the entire European portion of the Soviet Union, asking many of the same questions, and our preliminary analyses of these data reveal a remarkable degree of similarity (e.g., Gibson and Duch 1992a, 1991b; Duch and Gibson 1991). While the Moscow sample does not entitle us to draw conclusions about the USSR, we are doubtful that these findings are an artifact of the particular sample.

A more compelling explanation for our findings focuses on two major factors: change in the social and economic infrastructure of the USSR and the pervasiveness of world-wide telecommunications. Though our understanding of these processes is without doubt speculative, it is useful to try to fill out this picture just a bit.

Social scientists have long considered the implications of socioeconomic development for democratization. It is typically assumed that industrialization and advanced socioeconomic development (almost) inevitably give rise to conditions favoring the development of democracy. As economies industrialize, society differentiates, and centralized control becomes more difficult. With social differentiation comes the diversification of interests; decentralization seems to enhance demands for autonomy and control. As people seek more control over their lives as a means of advancing their interests, they often demand greater control over and responsiveness from the political system. As Talcott Parsons put it more than 25 years ago, “. . . it seems a safe prediction that Communism will, from its own internal dynamics, evolve in the direction of the restoration—or where it has not yet existed, the institution of political democracy. . . . Political democracy is the *only* possible outcome—except for general destruction or breakdown” (1964, 397). Similarly, Lapidus traces modern Soviet culture to moderniza-

tion processes that were particularly important during the 1960s and 1970s, especially the urbanization of the country, the broad access to and utilization of educational institutions, and the ready availability of media (television in particular) (1989, 127). She argues: "By the 1980s . . . it was among young people and the better educated that new attitudes and values were taking root, and these included a more critical view of state control over economic life, greater openness to private economic activity, and greater commitment to personal freedom and individual rights" (1989, 128). Her observations are quite compatible with our analysis.

The world has also witnessed rather dramatic changes in telecommunications, ranging from cable television, VCRs, and facsimile machines, to computers and telephones. The consequence of this change is that information is much more difficult to control than it ever has been in the past. Indeed, the very notion of a totalitarian society may well have been made obsolete by technological change. Add (in the case of the Soviet Union) more opportunity to travel—both to the West but even to eastern and central Europe—and increases in knowledge of alternative institutional structures and processes becomes impossible to block. As White put it when he (unsympathetically) described this line of thought: "The essential thesis . . . that the Communist states must eventually acquire the secular and bargaining political culture which corresponds to their economic and social modernity, is one that finds support across a surprisingly diverse spectrum of political opinion and scholarship" (1979, 173).

We suspect that in many respects the Soviet Union has experienced a classic pattern of economic development outstripping political development. That is, in Dahl's terms, there is evidence that the USSR has developed the infrastructure conducive to democratization—relatively high levels of education, a reasonably sophisticated telecommunications system, etc. In addition, many Soviets—especially those who are more highly educated, have traveled in recent times to both eastern Europe and the West, providing them a quite different (even if, in many ways, unrealistic) perspective on life elsewhere. These factors have fueled the dissatisfaction of this class, leading to a variety of demands for change.

What we cannot be sure of is whether democratization is valued in itself, or whether it is perceived as a means toward economic change in the USSR. In some respects, those who value democracy seem to be those who are most dissatisfied with the existing regime. Whether this alienation stems from dissatisfaction with the political system, or whether it is primarily economic dissatisfaction, we cannot ascertain. We suspect that a considerable portion of the population favors democratic processes as a means of getting new leadership that will more effectively deal with the widespread economic problems of the USSR. Unfortunately, our research provides few clues to

whether the Soviet people will continue to support democratic values even if the Soviet economy continues to deteriorate.

Moreover, if Soviet culture has changed, how profound are those changes? That is, one can imagine that Soviet citizens are doing no more than conforming to a new democratic orthodoxy, rather than fully embracing democratic processes and institutions. Like Levi jeans and religion, democracy is quite fashionable in the USSR today. Has our survey captured anything more than an ephemeral fad, one that will dissipate just as has happened so many times before in democratizing polities?

Unfortunately, we do not know. The consolidation of democracy is perhaps as difficult as the initial plunge toward democratization. Democratization is far from a linear or even monotonic movement toward an ideal political system. The U.S. case is replete with examples of periods of the expansion *and contraction* of democratic institutions and processes. We could hardly expect otherwise in the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the Soviet Union withstood a coup attempt by antidemocratic forces in August 1991. The August putsch was defeated, some say, in part because many Muscovites (and Leningraders) took to the streets to defend their government. While it is difficult to estimate the magnitude of the active resistance to the coup, and consequently we are unwilling to draw firm conclusions at the moment about the meaning of the coup for the development of a democratic political culture in the USSR,<sup>38</sup> it is undeniable that some segment of the Soviet population valued democratic institutions and processes so dearly that they were willing to risk death to defeat the antidemocratic forces. It is also undeniable that predictions that Soviets would mobilize on behalf of virtually any effort to restore order in the country, even antidemocratic efforts, were in error. We cannot claim that the events of the coup necessarily support our interpretations in this article, but they certainly are not incompatible with the picture we have painted of Soviet political culture.

The fact that the Soviet people are willing to endorse some democratic institutions and processes is important. We do not know if the Soviets will tire of the disorder so often associated with democratization; nor do we know if democratic values are deeply instilled within the Soviet people. We are confident, however, that the future development of democracy in the USSR is more likely when citizens accept democratic values, as they do here, than when they reject them.

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<sup>38</sup> Our fieldwork on resistance to the coup will be conducted later this year (1991).

## APPENDIX A: THE SAMPLE

1. *The Universe.* The Moscow survey is based on a representative sample of the Moscow *Oblast*, including the city of Moscow. The *oblast* is an area of 47,000 square kilometers and includes 39 administrative raions, 69 cities, and 74 urban settlements. The population of the *oblast* is nearly 16 million, and 79% of the *oblast* is classified as urban. The city of Moscow has a population of roughly nine million.

2. *The Sample.* The Moscow sample was drawn through a two-stage process. At the first stage, 32 regions of the city of Moscow and 54 populated areas of the Moscow *Oblast* were selected from all geographical units within the *oblast*. At the second stage, individual respondents were selected from lists of residents maintained by the central address bureau. A total of 550 respondents was randomly selected from the list.

3. *Respondent Selection.* The Moscow *Oblast* respondents were selected randomly from lists of residents maintained by the central address bureau. Using the records of the address bureaus and farm records, specific named respondents were identified. Thus, unlike many western samples, there was no need to select individual respondents within households using household enumeration methods.

It is important to consider whether the records of the address and farm bureaus constitute a useful sampling frame. Certainly these records are superior to using voting lists, which are derived mainly from the address and farm records themselves. But using these records clearly has some disadvantages, in addition to their many important advantages.

The first question is whether these records fairly completely enumerate the population. We believe they probably do. There is a strong incentive for all Soviet people to register with the bureaus. It is the records from these bureaus that are used to issue the internal passports. Not only is it a criminal offense not to register, but this is also the required point of registration for military service. These records have also become quite important recently for purposes of rationing. These records also have the advantage of being updated continuously.

At the same time, however, it is clear that some Soviets do not live where they are thought to live according to the official records. The proportion of people in this category is impossible to judge with any precision, but is probably on the order of 10% to 15% in large cities, much less in small cities, and practically nil in villages and rural areas. Thus, it was impossible to locate some of the respondents selected to be interviewed because they did not live where we expected them to live.

4. *Response Rate.* Of the 550 respondents selected, 40 respondents could not be contacted, even after as many as three visits to their homes. In

addition, there was a single overt refusal to be interviewed, and one additional questionnaire was rejected because it could not be verified. Four interviews included too much missing data to be usable. Thus, the total number of respondents in the survey is 504. The response rate is therefore 92%.

5. *The Questionnaire.* The survey instrument was constructed primarily in the United States, but was pretested in Moscow, and was significantly revised by both the American and Soviet research teams working closely together.<sup>39</sup> The survey asked a broad array of questions on many topics. The survey instrument was back-translated twice and every effort was made to ensure that the questions, though mainly western in origin, were tailored to the Soviet cultural context. Special attention was given to training the interviewers in techniques more common in Western survey research. Of course, the respondents had no idea that the survey was in any way connected with an American research project.

6. *The Interviewers.* Interviewers were recruited and trained by staff from the Institute of Sociology (USSR Academy of Sciences). The interviewers were instructed in standard interview techniques. All of the 59 interviewers used in the project completed the questionnaire. Like interviewers in the West, these interviewers were largely female (66%). The average age was 24 years old. Reflecting their associations with the Academy of Sciences, the interviewers are quite well educated, even though three-fourths report an average monthly income of less than 150 rubles per family member. Only 5% of the interviewers are members of the Communist party, while 70% are members of a trade union. Thus, the Moscow interviewers are better educated than western interviewers, but in most other respects are similar to their western colleagues.

Several steps were taken to discourage cheating on the interviews. First, a fairly elaborate system of supervision was put in place. Second, each questionnaire was carefully checked by a supervisor. Third, with just a few exceptions, interviewers were not allowed to conduct a great number of interviews. The average number of interviews conducted per interviewer is 8.5 (minimum = 1 interview, 3 interviewers; maximum = 16 interviews, 2 interviewers). Finally, verification of interviews was successful in a small percentage of the cases. No instances of falsification were discovered.

7. *Data Reliability.* As with all surveys, there can be no absolute guarantee of the reliability of all the data collected. All that we can guarantee is that every reasonable step to insure the quality of the data was in fact taken.

8. *The Attributes of the Respondents.* Table A reports a number of relevant attributes of the sample. It appears from these data that our sample is reasonably representative of the *oblast*.

<sup>39</sup> The Moscow instrument was designed in part by Joseph Sanders.

TABLE A  
ATTRIBUTES OF MOSCOW OBLAST SAMPLE

	Sample (N = 504) (%)	Census (%)
Place of residence <sup>a</sup>		
Moscow City	56	58
Moscow <i>Oblast</i>	44	42
Nationality <sup>b</sup>		
Russian	92	91
Ukrainian	3	2
Jewish	2	2
Belorussian	1	1
Tatar	1	1
Other	1	2
Level of Education <sup>c</sup>		
Unfinished secondary school	11	24
Finished general secondary school	19	28
Finished special secondary school	31	19
Unfinished tertiary education	5	2
Finished tertiary education	32	13
Gender <sup>d</sup>		
Female	53	55
Male	47	45
Average age (in years) <sup>d</sup>	40 years	35 years
Monthly Income		
Less than 60 rubles	6	not available
60-100 rubles	33	
101-150	32	
151-200 rubles	18	
202-300 rubles	8	
Greater than 300 rubles	3	

<sup>a</sup>*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v. 1989 g.* (The economy of the USSR in 1989). Moscow: Finansy, statistika, 1990, 21 and 83.

<sup>b</sup>*Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR (Nationalities of the USSR)*, vol. 4 of *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (The results of the All-Union Census of population for 1970). Moscow: Statistika, 1973, 103-104.

<sup>c</sup>*Uroven' obrazovaniya naseleniya SSSR, soyuznykh avtonomnykh respublik, Krayev, oblastey: chast' I* (Level of education of the population of the USSR, Union Republics, Autonomous Republics, Krays, and Oblasts: Part I), vol. 3 of *Itog vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (The results of the All-Union Census of population for 1979). Moscow: Statistika, 1989, 119-20 and 209-10.

<sup>d</sup>*Pol, vozrast, sostoyaniye v brake naseleniya oblastey; chast' 1* (Sex, age and marital status of the population of the USSR, Union Republics, Autonomous Republics, Krays, and Oblasts; Part I), vol. 2 of *Itog' vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 goda* (The results of the All-Union Census of population for 1979). Moscow: Statistika 1989, 9, 181-83.

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